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Abstract: 
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a 
decentralized country, using the French experience in urban municipalities. We estimate a model of tax 
setting for local business tax using spatial and dynamic econometric techniques, for the period 1993-
2003 and an unbalanced data set. As predicted by the theory, we find that reducing the number of 
municipalities is likely to limit tax competition and, as a consequence, increase local business tax 
rates. 
Keywords: fiscal cooperation, tax competition, vertical externalities, local business tax 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following seminal work by ZODROW and MIESZKOWSKI (1986), WILSON (1986) and 
WILSDASIN (1988) – see WILSON (1999) for a survey – many theoretical studies have 
emphasized that tax competition can result in inefficiently small levels of local public 
spending. The reason for this is that when tax bases are mobile, the fiscal action of a 
benevolent authority will affect the budget constraint of another jurisdiction, through a policy-
driven flow of resources between localities. Consequently, taxes can remain inefficiently low. 
The inefficiency is based on the fact that each jurisdiction sees capital flight as a cost and does 
not consider the positive fiscal externalities generated for other localities. Local authorities 
perceive the marginal cost of public funds as being higher than the true cost to the economy as 
a whole.  
 
Possible policy correctives for the undersupply of local public goods have been 
discussed extensively in the literature. Several alternatives have been proposed to correct for 
this inefficiency: a state (or federal) intervention, such as the imposition of minimum tax 
requirements on local authorities, an increase in revenue sharing or matching grants to lower 
the cost of local public services, the provision of local public goods by state (or federal) 
governments or the consolidation of local jurisdictions. In relation to this last, HOYT (1991) 
demonstrates that limiting competition by reducing the number of the localities in a 
metropolis increases tax rates and welfare. A smaller number of jurisdictions reduces the 
externalities due to capital flow and, therefore, reduces the differences to the social optimum. 
In this model, therefore, the optimal number of jurisdictions is one. However, for Hoyt, there 
is a trade-off between erasing horizontal fiscal externality by reducing the number of 
jurisdictions, and promoting taste stratification à la Tiebout based on a large number of 
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jurisdictions.  
Consolidation can take different forms - from municipal mergers to fiscal cooperation. 
Many European countries have implemented waves of inter-municipal cooperation: Austria 
and Sweden in the 1950s, Germany and Belgium in the 1970s and, more recently, 
Switzerland, Greece, Denmark and Latvia (HULST et al., 2009). Although, the need for local 
authorities to cooperate over the provision of local public goods is on the political agenda of 
many officials, very few empirical papers investigate the impact of such cooperative 
agreement on local public policies.
1 
The present paper aims to assess the effects of fiscal 
cooperation on local taxation based on French experience.  
The French case offers a favourable setting for research on fiscal cooperation. Local 
government is structured broadly in three or four tiers: the lowest tier comprises some 36,600 
municipalities, the second tier consists of 96 counties and the top tier is the 22 regions of 
France. Each layer of local government has wide fiscal autonomy: each level sets its own tax 
rates on a common tax base, for a large range of direct local taxes, which account for 75% of 
local tax revenues. Furthermore, most French municipalities (about 90% in 2006) are grouped 
within larger jurisdictions (known as „Etablissements Publics de Coopération 
Intercommunale‟ or EPCI). These jurisdictions, together with the municipalities, have a large 
degree of autonomy to set local business tax rates. They can set a single business tax rate 
(“Taxe Professionnelle Unique”) or apply an additional business tax rate. In the first case, this 
single tax rate applies to all jurisdictions that belong to the inter-municipal group, meaning 
that the municipalities are not free to set their own business tax rates. Thus, this fiscal 
cooperation regime effectively merges or consolidates the municipalities. In the case of an 
additional business tax rate, an additional level of local government is introduced, allowing 
localities and inter-municipal jurisdictions to tax the same business base.  
 5 
The main contribution of this paper is that it exploits this empirical setting and allows 
us to test the impact of fiscal cooperation on multi-level government. We estimate a model of 
tax setting for the local business tax for the period 1993-2003, using spatial and dynamic 
econometric techniques and an unbalanced data set. As predicted by the theory, we find that 
fiscal cooperation is likely to limit tax competition and, as a consequence, to increase local 
business tax rates. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of capital 
taxation in multi-level government. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and the empirical 
design. Section 5 presents the results for the estimates on the impact of consolidation on tax 
rate levels. Section 6 provides robustness checks using Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
This section presents a simple framework that allows us to capture the effect of consolidation 
on local business tax rates in a decentralized country. Extending HOYT (1991), our aim is to 
investigate the impact of the number of competing localities on local business tax rates in a 
multi-level government. The model thus combines the simultaneous existence of horizontal 
and vertical externalities.
2
 
 
We consider a very simple model of capital taxation with two layers of local 
government (municipality and region) co-occupying the same tax base. We suppose that the 
common tax base is the capital employed by a single, perfectly competitive, representative 
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firm. This firm produces a homogeneous private good using two inputs: capital and labour. 
Labour is assumed to be fixed in production, but capital is a variable factor. We can write the 
production function of the representative firm as )(kf  where k  denotes the employed 
capital; f  is increasing in k , with decreasing marginal production of capital ( f  0 ). The 
representative firm maximizes its profits with respect to k , yielding  
 
kpkf  )(            (1) 
 
Equation (1) implicitly defines the firm‟s capital demand as )( kpk  with fk  /1 , where 
21 ttpk    denotes the pre-tax return on capital,   is the exogenous post-tax return, and 
1t  and 2t  respectively are the tax rates set by the upper (i.e. the region) and the lower (i.e. the 
municipality) layers of government. 
 
We suppose that each layer of government plays Nash relative to the other layer. 
Following ANDERSSON et al. (2004), the utility function can be written such that municipal 
and regional public goods are not separable. For municipal government, the maximization 
problem is: 
 
)()(max 122
2

zzhwv
t
  subject to )(22 Kpktz      (2) 
where )(v and (.)2h  are strictly concave and  1,0  is an exogenous parameter capturing 
the extent to which municipal and regional public services are complements; complementarity 
is maximum for 1  and minimum for 0 . For the sake of simplicity, complementarity is 
assumed to be at maximum, i.e. 1 . 3 
Since capital owners are supposed to be outside the economy, the gross wage rate 
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))(()())(( KKK pkfpkpkfw   is assumed to be the only source of revenue for the 
representative citizen. 1z  and 2z  respectively are regional and municipal public goods.  
 
The first order condition (FOC) of the maximization problem is: 
 MCPFkktzh 

))/(1/( 212

       (3) 
 
Assuming that the marginal utility of private consumption is equal to 1, the left side of 
equation (3) is just the marginal benefit (MB) of the municipal-provided public good, while 
the right side is usually defined as the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). In evaluating 
the MCPF, municipal government recognizes only erosion of its own tax base, induced by a 
higher tax rate. However, the true MCPF might also include erosion of the regional tax base. 
Municipal government then underestimates the true MCPF and sets a tax rate that is too high 
from a social point of view. This is a well-known result from a tax competition model with 
vertical interactions (see e.g. FLOWERS, 1988; KEEN and KOTSOGIANNIS, 2002, 2004).  
From FOC (3), we obtain the municipal tax setting function: 
),( 12 ttt            (4) 
 
As the tax reaction function cannot be signed unambiguously, it is necessary to conduct an 
empirical analysis to establish the direction of the vertical tax interaction.  
 
The above analysis focuses only on the vertical interaction resulting from tax base 
sharing, thus it ignores the possibility of fiscal interdependencies due to tax base mobility 
among municipalities. Together with vertical interactions, we now include into the model the 
presence of horizontal tax interactions.  
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For the sake of simplicity in dealing with horizontal tax competition among 
municipalities, capital is assumed to be costlessly mobile across N identical municipalities 
),...,1( Ni  , and relocates until it earns the same net return on capital in each of them, Thus: 
  jjii ttkfttkf 212212 )()(    ji      (5)  
where 1t  is the regional tax rate, 
it2  (
jt2 ) is the tax rate in the municipality i  ( j ), and 
ik2  (
jk2 ) 
is the capital invested in municipality i  ( j ). From (5), it is easy to show that 
),,( 2212
iii tttkk           (6) 
where i  represents “the set of competing municipalities”. Note that we have 0/ 22 
ii dtdk  
and 0/ 22 
ii dtdk . 
 
In order to analyse tax competition under the assumption of strategic interactions 
among identical municipalities, we assume also that the regional economy is closed so that 
),.....,,( 2
2
2
1
2
N  is implicitly defined by the following market-clearing condition: 
 )()( 2
1
2
i
N
i
ikNS  

        (7) 
where )(S is the supply of savings in each municipality, and i2  
itt 21   is the aggregated 
tax rate borne by capital in the municipality i. We then have:  
)0,1(
)()(
)(1
/
22
22
2 








i
i
i
kS
k
N 

       (8) 
 
The FOC of the maximization problem of a given municipality becomes: 
 MCPF
kSN
k
k
kt
zh
i
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
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

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
     (9) 
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Equation (9) shows that the MCPF increases with the number N of competing 
municipalities. The higher the MCPF, the lower the equilibrium tax rate and public spending 
is. As shown in the standard literature, competition has a negative impact on the municipal tax 
rate level. Conversely, when N decreases, the government will set a higher tax rate and supply 
more public services. This outcome is in line with HOYT (1991) who demonstrates that 
limiting competition by reducing the number of localities in a metropolis increases tax rates. 
Finally, from (9), we obtain the municipal tax setting function: 
 ),,( 212 Ntttt
ii           (10) 
 
The tax rate chosen by a municipality depends not only on the tax rates set by the upper layer 
of government, but also on the tax rates and on the number of competing municipalities. As in 
HOYT (1991) without vertical interaction, the theoretical prediction of this model combining 
horizontal and vertical interactions is the following: the lower the number of competing 
municipalities, the less intense the horizontal tax competition, the higher will be the tax rate. 
However in our model there also is an impact of tax rate decided by the upper layer of 
government, although empirical analysis is needed to establish the sign of this impact.   
 
3. Data 
3.1. The French institutional context 
 
The French local institutional context is characterized by three or four overlapping 
tiers of local government. The lowest tier is made up of 36,000 municipalities, the middle-tier 
of 96 counties, and the highest level of local government is constituted by 22 regions. Most 
municipalities are grouped (voluntarily) into inter-municipal jurisdictions or EPCI. Since the 
„Chevènement‟ law enacted in 1999, these groups of municipalities are particularly favoured4 
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in France, and this structure is being chosen by a growing number of municipalities (almost 
30,000 in 2003). The municipalities and EPCI are responsible for local urban services, 
building maintenance provision of nurseries and primary schools and sports facilities, and 
maintenance of municipal roads and urban public transport. The counties administer social 
assistance, and maintain departmental roads and middle schools. Regions are responsible for 
the provision of vocational training, economic development and building, and maintenance of 
high schools. 
 
Local revenues come from taxation (54%) and grants (23%). The local business tax (or 
"Taxe Professionnelle") is the major source of local governments tax revenue, accounting for 
approximately 45% of the revenue derived from direct local taxes.
5
 The tax base consists 
mainly of capital goods and is based on the rental values of buildings and of equipment 
(assumed to be 16% of the original equipment cost). The remaining fiscal revenues are 
collected from households in the form of residential tax (“taxe d‟habitation”), property tax 
(“taxe foncière sur le bâti”) and land tax (“taxe foncière sur le non bâti”).  
Regions, counties, inter-municipal jurisdictions and municipalities have large 
autonomy in setting their tax rates on this tax base. The “local tax varying power” is the 
proportion of local resources represented by tax revenue, over which local authorities have 
some control; France has the second highest level of tax autonomy (54%) in the European 
Union, compared with 20% in Germany which is a federal country, Spain (35%) which is 
close to being a federal country, and the UK at 14%. Furthermore, the degree of tax revenue 
decentralization, computed as the ratio between sub-national government own tax revenue 
over consolidated general government total tax revenue, was equal to 18.4% in France in the 
period 1999-2001, while in the EU-15 it was 14% on average for the same period (see 
Stegarescu (2005) using OECD categories of tax autonomy). 
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As already noted French inter-municipal communities can impose an additional 
business tax rate or apply a single tax rate or “Taxe Professionnelle Unique”. In the latter 
case, municipalities forfeit their right to set their own business tax rates. Map 1 shows that 
inter-municipal cooperation increased greatly over the period of study (1993-2003).  
 
Insert Figure 1 (Map 1) 
 
 
3.2. Urban municipalities and local jurisdictions 
 
Here we are interested in municipalities that belong to urban employment centres, as 
defined by the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE).
6
 In 1999, metropolitan France had 
354 urban centres of employment accounting for at least 5,000 jobs. Note that the French 
definition of an urban employment centre is quite broad and is similar to the US metropolitan 
area except that the employment threshold is much lower (5,000 jobs compared to 100,000 
inhabitants).  
Urban employment centres, our sample, include around 3,000 municipalities. 
However, for all these municipalities we take into account possible interactions with 
neighbouring municipalities (located within a radius of 50 kilometres) whether or not they are 
included in our initial sample of municipalities. Fiscal data come from the Direction Générale 
des Collectivités Locales (DGCL, Ministère de l‟Intérieur). 
Graph 1 shows the number of municipalities in our sample, for each type of fiscal 
cooperation regime, over the period 1993 to 2003. At the beginning of the period, most 
municipalities do not cooperate. At the end of the period, most urban municipalities are part 
of the cooperation regime, which, since 1999, qualifies them for an extra state grant if they 
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apply a single business tax rate. 
 
Insert Figure 2 (Graph 1) 
 
Graph 2 shows the evolution of the business tax rate with or without fiscal 
cooperation. Municipalities that belong to single business tax jurisdictions impose heavier 
taxes than municipalities that are outside jurisdictions. The average difference between these 
two fiscal choices is about 3 points.  
 
Insert Figure 3 (Graph 2) 
 
Our basic data set thus contains three types of jurisdictions: isolated municipalities 
(outside cooperation); municipalities that belong to an additional tax jurisdiction‟ and 
municipalities that belong to a single business tax rate jurisdiction. As we are interested in 
taxation behaviour and consolidation, isolated municipalities and municipalities belonging to 
an additional tax rate jurisdiction were treated the same way: they are considered as a single 
observation. For isolated municipalities, the tax rate corresponds to the municipal rate. For 
municipalities belonging to an additional tax rate jurisdiction, the tax rate is the sum of the 
municipal and inter-municipal tax rates.
7
 All other variables are also observed at the 
municipal level. For single business tax jurisdictions, the level of observation is the inter-
municipality. The tax rate observed, as well as all other variables, is the inter-municipal tax 
rate.  
 
Graph 2 shows that the majority of municipalities have changed their cooperation 
status over time; some municipalities joined an inter-municipal group, whatever its fiscal 
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status (additional or single business tax), others left one jurisdiction to join another (often), or 
to return to being autonomous (very rarely). Some jurisdictions have changed fiscal status, 
often (but always) moving from the additional tax regime to the single business tax.  
Our analysis concerns urban municipalities as defined by INSEE. However, one 
jurisdiction is included in the data set when it contains one of these urban municipalities. Our 
sample is therefore much more larger than a sample of only these urban municipalities. In 
order to calculate the time lag variables, one spatial unit (municipality or SBT jurisdiction) 
should be present in the sample for at least two years. The Paris municipality is excluded 
because of its very specific fiscal status.
8
 Table 1 presents the sample structure. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Table 1 shows how fiscal cooperation enlarged after 1999. At the beginning of the 
period, the number of SBT jurisdictions was very small with only 143 municipalities, and 
2,975 municipalities outside this form of inter-municipality. Between 1999 and 2001, the 
number of SBT jurisdictions increased fivefold and remained stable until the end of period. 
The number of municipalities joining a SBT jurisdiction continued to increase after 2001. In 
2003, there were 1,028 municipalities and 206 SBT jurisdictions, including 2,886 
municipalities.  
 
Therefore, our sample is definitively an unbalanced panel in which observations and 
their characteristics change over time. It consists of a total of 2,981 municipalities and 209 
SBT jurisdictions. Because of the introduction of a time lag which deletes the first year 
observed, the estimates refer to 25,137 observations. In this sample, there are 12,941 
observations related to municipalities belonging to an additional tax jurisdiction. On average, 
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the share of local taxation due to an additional tax regime is only 21% of the total local tax 
rate (municipal plus inter-municipal). 71% of municipalities that join a SBT jurisdiction 
belonged previously to an additional jurisdiction. 
 
4. Empirical design 
 
Since the aim of this paper is to study the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation 
in a multi-level government context, we have to deal with horizontal and vertical tax 
interactions. To take account of possible horizontal tax interactions, we need to consider 
spatial dependence in a panel data framework. From theoretical framework, the municipal tax 
setting function (equation (10)) provides a local policy reaction function that can be written as 
follows:  
 ),,( ,,, NTtRt titjti             (11) 
 
where ti,t is the vector of tax rates in a municipality or in a SBT jurisdiction i at time t,
9
 tj ,t  is 
the vector of tax rates in the set of the other municipalities or SBT jurisdictions j (j ≠ i) at time 
t, Ti,t is the vector of tax rates applied by other tiers (county, region) in observation i at time t, 
N is the number of jurisdictions. 
 
This reaction function is in line with the literature on tax interactions (see, e.g., 
BRUECKNER and SAAVEDRA, 2001; BRUECKNER, 2003; REVELLI, 2001, 2003; 
SOLE-OLLE, 2003), but it also takes into account the consolidation effect, i.e., the fact that 
reducing the number N of competing localities increases tax rates. 
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4.1. Cooperation effects 
 
 In order to deal with the theoretical prediction that limiting competition by reducing the 
number N of the increases tax rates, we use the French empirical setting where municipalities 
may or may not belong to an inter-municipality. Instead of introducing N in equation (11), we 
focus on cooperation process effects and introduce a dummy variable to capture belonging to 
an inter-municipal community for some observations (with SBT regime). 
 
 We investigate whether cooperation affects not only the jurisdiction tax rate, but also the 
tax interactions with neighbouring municipalities or SBT jurisdictions; thus, we include the 
interactions among the SBT dummy variable and tax rates in the set of other municipalities or 
SBT jurisdictions. The aim is to check whether horizontal tax interactions are stronger or not 
if the observation is an inter-municipal group. Because the number of competing jurisdictions 
decreases in conditions of fiscal cooperation, the horizontal tax interactions should decrease. 
Tax competition should be weaker among groups of municipalities than among isolated 
municipalities. Also, inter-municipal jurisdictions that set a single business tax rate will carry 
more weight and may be less influenced by the tax decisions of neighbouring localities. 
 
 A local feature variables vector is also introduced, to control for other jurisdiction 
characteristics. Finally, our econometric model, derived from the theoretical model, is as 
following:  
),,SBT,SBT,( ,,,ti,ti,,, tititjtjti XTttRt           (12) 
where SBTi,t is a fiscal cooperation dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation i 
is a SBT jurisdiction. The expected sign of SBTi,t is positive. Xi,t is the vector of the economic 
features of the municipality or SBT jurisdiction i at time t.  
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4.2. Potential endogeneity of SBT dummy 
 
The SBT jurisdiction dummy could potentially be subject to endogeneity since 
municipalities that choose to cooperate have common unobservable features that affect their 
tax rates. In order to address this possibility, we instrument the SBT dummy using two 
instruments. The first is share of the area represented by the spatial unit (municipality or 
group) in the total area of all units observed at time t. The larger the share occupied by a 
spatial unit, the more likely it cooperates. The second instrument is an index that measures the 
local propensity to cooperate. Map 1 shows that, historically, there has been a greater 
willingness for municipalities to cooperate in certain regions, such as the western part of 
France. Our index allows this regional effect to be taken into account. It is calculated as the 
ratio of number of SBT groups to number of spatial units divided by the ratio of number of 
municipalities in a SBT group to total number of groups. The index includes all the 
observations at time t, calculated in a radius of 50 km around the spatial unit observed. 
Therefore, it controls for variation in the local propensity to cooperate.  
 
4.3. Spatial dependence 
 
 As suggested by ANSELIN (1988), an a priori set of interactions needs to be deﬁned 
and tested. While a variety of weighting schemes could be applied, allowing different patterns 
of spatial interaction, a scheme commonly used in the relevant empirical literature assigns 
weights based on Euclidean distance or contiguity (BRUECKNER, 2003).  
 
 In line with this literature, we chose a precise geographical deﬁnition of neighbourhood 
based on the Euclidean distance between jurisdictions. This scheme imposes smooth distance 
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decay, with weights wij given by 1/dij where dij is the Euclidian distance between jurisdictions 
i and j for j ≠ i. (wij =1/dij if dij  25 kms, otherwise wij =0). The weight matrix (W
d25) is 
standardized so that the elements in each row sum to 1.
10
 We replace the vector tj,t with a 
weighted average, such as ,*ij j t
j
w t , which implies that every municipality responds in the 
same way to the weighted average tax rates.  
 
 We also test an alternative and commonly used weight matrix, the contiguity matrix 
(Wcontig). The contiguity matrix considers that two geographic units i and j are neighbours if 
they have a common border (wij=1, otherwise wij=0). 
 
These spatial weight matrices obviously change over the period since the number of 
observations changes over the period. Table 2 gives the number of spatial units used in the 
spatial lags, for Wd25 and Wcontig. The average number of neighbours is 3 for the contiguity 
matrix (Wcontig) and 11 for the inverse distance matrix (Wd25). In both cases, we chose a broad 
definition of neighbourhood in order to avoid border effects. Neighbouring municipalities 
may belong to rural areas and may not be part of our initial sample of urban local 
jurisdictions. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 The presence of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of equation (12) raises 
two main econometric issues.  
 
 First, if municipalities react to other‟s tax rate choices, then competing municipalities‟ 
taxation decisions are endogenous and correlated with the error term (ε). OLS (ordinary least 
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squares) yields a biased estimate of parameter ρ (ANSELIN, 1988). There are two possible 
approaches that provide consistent estimates of the spatial parameter: the first is based on 
instrumental variables (IV) and the second is based on maximum likelihood. In this paper, we 
compute IV/GMM estimators for two main reasons. First, our main variable of interest (single 
business tax jurisdiction dummy) might be endogenous. FINGLETON and LE GALLO 
(2007, 2008) show that IV/GMM estimators are useful in those cases where spatial 
dependence models contain one or more endogenous explanatory variables (apart from the 
spatially lagged dependent variable).
11
 Second, as already argued, since neighbouring 
municipalities may belong to rural areas and not be part of our sample of urban local 
jurisdictions, the usual maximum likelihood (ML) routines cannot be used here. We need 
variables that are correlated with competing municipality tax choices, but are uncorrelated 
with the error term. We use the weighted average of some of the neighbour control variables 
as instruments.
12
. 
 Second, if neighbours‟ localities are subject to correlated shocks, we may find a 
correlation between jurisdictions‟ spending choices. Omitting the spatially dependent 
explanatory variables may generate spatial dependence in the error term, which is given by 
the following equation:  
    titjti W ,,,           (13) 
If spatial error dependence is ignored, estimation of (12) may provide false evidence of 
strategic interaction. However, the IV method yields consistent estimations of (12) even with 
spatial error dependence.  
 
4.4. Serial correlation 
 
Serial correlation may arise because French municipal tax decisions can be persistent 
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over time. To allow for possible serial correlation we include a time-lagged dependent 
variable (DEVEREUX et al., 2007). This introduces correlation with the municipal fixed 
effect. To deal with this, we instrument the lagged dependent variable by including the 
municipal property tax rate and the municipal residential tax rate. The legislation restrains the 
evolution of these different local taxes; one municipality cannot modify its business tax rate 
independently for property or the residential tax rate. Any increases in the different local tax 
rates must be made jointly. This legislation ensures that local government cannot increase the 
business tax rate too hugely without the approval of the voters who pay residential and 
property taxes.  
 
Therefore, our final specification is: 
 
 
tittitititi
R
ti
C
tititjtjtitiiti
TimeOldYoungIncDens
TTSBTWtWtSBTtt
,,,,,
,,,,2,1,1,,
     


 
 (14) 
where αi is the municipal fixed effect, SBTi,t is the fiscal cooperation dummy, Wtj,t is the 
weighted tax rate of neighbouring municipalities, Wtj,t*SBTi,t is the interaction variable 
between the weighted tax rate and the fiscal cooperation dummy, T
C
i,t is the county tax rate, 
T
R
i,t is the regional tax rate, Densi,t is the municipal or jurisdictional density, Inci,t is the 
average municipal or jurisdictional income, Youngi,t is the share of residents aged under 14 
years, and Oldi,t is the share of people in the municipality or jurisdiction i aged over 60 years. 
Timet are year dummies included to capture common shocks.  
 
 In addition, county and regional business tax rates (Ti,t) might be endogenous. 
We instrument them with the county property tax rate and the regional property tax rate 
respectively. Once again, at these tiers, the different tax rates change in a coordinated way.
13
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 We test the validity of the instrument sets using a standard over-identifying restrictions 
(Sargan/Hansen) test. A large value of the partial R² in the first step confirms that these 
instruments are sufficient to explain the endogenous variables. We treat the remaining control 
variables as exogenous.
14
  
 
All variables are log-transformed. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 
A1. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Appendix Table A2 shows the results of the IV estimations using the within transformed 
model considering the SBT dummy as an exogenous variable. Since the fiscal cooperation 
dummy is time-invariant for each individual (with a value of 0 for 2,981 municipalities and a 
value of 1 for 209 cooperating localities), this variable is dropped in the within transformation 
(deviation from the individual mean). However, there are other ways of estimating the within 
model: we can introduce a dummy for each individual (3,190=2,981+209) and no constant 
term, or introduce a dummy for each individual and a constant term and restrict the sum of the 
individual dummies to be equal to zero. Using this second formulation, for the constant 
parameter we obtain the mean fixed effect, and the individual deviation from this mean in the 
dummies. This change in parameterization has no impact on the other estimated parameters. 
We followed the same reasoning to obtain our estimate of the SBT dummy and we restricted 
the sum of the 209 SBT jurisdictions dummies to be equal to zero. 
Table 3 shows the results using the IV method when SBT is endogenous. The estimation 
 21 
results are very similar. 
Insert Table 3 
 
Below, we present the main results of our estimations. Table 3 shows that the time-
lagged endogenous variable (ti,t-1) is always significant and takes a positive sign in all the 
specifications (columns 1 to 5). This result confirms the consistency of the autoregressive 
specification. Since the coefficients of the lagged business tax rates provide an estimate of 
about 0.7, we can assume relatively high levels of persistence in the tax rates. As expected, 
local business tax rates are likely to change very slowly over time. 
 
The estimation results also confirm the existence of tax interactions among and 
between jurisdictions. First, the coefficients associated with a neighbour‟s tax rate (Wtj,t) is 
always significantly positive, implying the existence of horizontal tax interactions between 
French jurisdictions. The estimate takes a value of about 0.3. This implies that an average tax 
increase of 10% in neighbouring jurisdictions induces an increase of around 3% in the 
business tax rate. Note that this result is close to those obtained in studies of other countries 
(see e.g. HEYNDELS and VUCHELEN, 1998; BRUECKNER and SAAVEDRA, 2001; 
REVELLI, 2001; RICHARD et al., 2002; SOLE-OLLE, 2003). 
Second, the tax parameter associated with the county tax rate (T
C
) is significantly 
positive, while the regional tax rate (T
R
) is not significant. The estimation of our spatial tax 
model with several levels of local government, leads us to reject the hypothesis of vertical tax 
interactions between French local jurisdictions and the regional government level. However, 
county and local business tax rates seem to interact (as in CHARLOT and PATY, 2010). It 
seems that county and municipal/inter-municipal business tax rates are likely to be strategic 
complements because counties and localities supply many complementary local public 
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services. 
We turn next to the main estimation results associated with the fiscal cooperation parameter, 
which here represents implementation of the single business tax rate by the inter-municipal 
community. We find a positive and significant sign for the parameter associated with this 
fiscal regime (SBTi,t) in all specifications. We can confirm our theoretical predictions that 
reducing the number of competing localities increases tax rates.  
 
Result 1: Fiscal cooperation is likely to increase local business tax rates. 
 
We investigate the extent of tax competition in more depth by interacting neighbour‟s 
tax rates with the single business tax rate (columns 3 and 5).
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 We find a significant and 
negative sign for the parameter associated with this interaction variable, and a positive and 
significant sign for neighbour‟s tax rates, which suggests that applying a single business tax 
rate is likely to decrease very much the intensity of the horizontal tax interactions. Horizontal 
tax interactions are thus strongly weaker if the observation is an inter-municipal group. Since 
the number of competing jurisdictions decreases in conditions of fiscal cooperation, the 
horizontal tax interactions decrease. Since both parameters have a very similar value 
(columns 3 and 5), this might suggest that there are no longer any tax interactions between a 
SBT group of municipalities and its neighbours. This outcome, in turn, would suggest that 
inter-municipal jurisdictions that set a single business tax rate carry more weight and are less 
(or not) influenced by the tax decisions of neighbouring localities. 
 
Result 2: Fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce (cancel) horizontal tax interactions 
among neighbouring municipalities. 
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Finally, in terms of the estimation results associated with the remaining explanatory 
variables, the coefficient associated with population density has the expected positive sign: 
the larger the municipality‟s population, the greater will be local public needs. Average 
income - included to measure demand for public services at the municipal level, share of 
young (under 14s) and the share of elderly (over 60s), is never significant.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
 
To check the robustness of our results, we provide estimation results using GMM 
(Tables 4a, 4b and 4c). WOOLDRIDGE (2002) recommends providing efficient GMM 
estimates in the presence of arbitrary intra-cluster correlation. With this methodology, the 
intra-cluster correlation can be any form, from serial correlation to random effects or some 
other, therefore we have no estimates for the time-lagged dependent variable. Estimates 
should also be efficient in the presence of spatial error dependence if spatially linked 
individuals are included in the same cluster.  
Clusters are defined as follows. First, municipalities and the groups they belong to are 
included in the same cluster. Then groups are included in the same cluster when they 
comprise municipalities that are not in our sample, but have a common border with the 
observed groups. Finally, the 3,190 spatial units observed are distributed across 286 clusters. 
This methodology is aimed at controlling for spatial autocorrelation into each cluster.  
The different sets of instruments are described in Table 4a. They are similar to those 
chosen in the previous section; propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of exogenous covariates, 
etc. We also introduce number of years the observation has been present in the sample to 
control for potential attrition. We follow the procedure described in BAUM et al. (2003).  
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Since this procedure, which is applied to the within transformation, does not give a 
direct estimation of the parameter associated with our binary variable SBT, we run GMM to 
get a consistent estimate using the residuals obtained in the first stage (Table 4b). In Table 4c, 
we also provide a ML estimator using the same two-step method, which takes account of the 
binary nature of SBT using a probit (see CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2010, p. 193). 
Insert Tables 4a, 4b and 4c 
 
The estimates are broadly the same as in the previous tables, which confirms the 
robustness of the previous results. The spatial lag parameter associated with neighbours‟ tax 
rates exhibits a higher value, around 0.7, and is positive and highly significant. When this 
variable is interacted with the SBT dummy, then again the value of the associated parameter 
offsets the previous value, suggesting that tax interactions between an inter-municipal 
jurisdiction and its neighbours are very weak. The parameter associated with the SBT dummy 
also remains significant and positive, although with a higher value than in the previous 
section, confirming that cooperation increases the level of business tax rates. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The theoretical literature frequently emphasizes that cooperation between local governments 
could resolve inefficiencies, but there are very few empirical studies analyzing effect of 
cooperation on the tax rate set by local governments. The objective of the present paper was 
to assess the effects of consolidation on local taxation, based on the French experience. Since 
1999, local cooperation has been widely promoted by the French government with the 
provision of financial incentives to solve the problem of “municipal fragmentation”. 
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Municipalities and inter-municipalities have large autonomy to set their tax rates to finance 
their supply of public services. We exploited this empirical setting, which allowed us to test 
the impact of fiscal cooperation in a multi-level government structure. We estimated a model 
of tax setting for the local business tax using spatial and dynamic econometric techniques, 
based on an unbalanced panel for the period 1993-2003. Our results confirm that 
consolidation limits tax competition and increases the level of local business tax rates. 
 
 However, further research should be conducted to increase our understanding of the 
effect of fiscal cooperation on local public policies. For example, on the public spending side, 
the inter-municipal community might have been supplied new local services or better quality 
public services by. The supply of these new public goods may explain the observed increase 
in the local tax pressure. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 : Map 1: Distribution of inter-municipal jurisdictions and their tax regimes 
 
   in 1993      in 2003 
 
Additional business tax rate   (445)
Single business tax rate   (21)
Additional business tax rate   (1420)
Single business tax rate   (925)
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Figure 2 : Graph 1: Distribution of municipalities in each fiscal cooperation regime 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graph 2: Distribution of municipalities in and out fiscal cooperation 
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1
 EMINI (2009) and EMINI and SANTOLINI (2010) investigate the impact of inter-jurisdictional agreements in 
Italy, focusing on local public spending. 
2
 Theoretical tax competition models with horizontal and vertical externalities are developed by 
FLOWERS (1988), KEEN and KOTSOGIANNIS (2002, 2004), KEEN (1995, 1998), WREDE (1996), 
FLOCHEL and MADIES (2002), BUCOVETSKY (2009). 
3
 CHARLOT and PATY (2010) provide some support for this assumption in the French case. 
4
 An extra state grant is awarded to inter-municipal jurisdictions that opt for the single business tax regime. 
5
 This tax was removed in 2010 and replaced by a territorial economic contribution based on property and value 
added. 
6
 The choice of urban municipalities introduces a possible selection bias. However, tax rates are not available 
for all rural municipalities. 
7
 The inter-municipal tax rate is the same for all municipalities belonging to that cooperation form and is set by 
the inter-municipal jurisdiction. 
8
 Paris is a municipality, but also a county. 
9
 The SBT rate or the municipal plus additional tax rate if the municipality cooperates, the municipal tax rate if 
it does not. 
10
 Standardization may be justified for technical reasons. Parameter value is comprised between -1 and 1, which 
greatly facilitates its interpretation. However, the interpretation must be in terms of relative, not absolute, 
distance between units of observation. See ANSELIN (1988) for more detail. 
11
 See also ELHORST (2010, p.15) on this issue. 
12
 The list of instruments is detailed for each estimate in the relevant results tables. 
13
 As REULIER and ROCABOY (2009) argue, regions are not completely free to set their own tax rates. 
Limiting rules generate some relationships between business, housing and property tax rates. 
14
 We performed standard exogeneity tests for the control variables; there was no evidence of endogeneity. 
15
 Note that. in columns 3 and 5 where we include interacted variables, the parameters associated with SBT 
dummy and neighbour‟s tax rates cannot be interpreted as capturing an unconditional effect of these variables 
(see BRAMBOR et al., 2006, p.72). In such a multiplicative interaction models, the coefficient of SBT only 
captures the effect of cooperation on business tax rate when there is no horizontal tax interaction among 
municipalities. 
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Table 1: Sample structure 
Year Spatial units (*) 
Municipalities 
outside SBT 
jurisdiction 
SBT 
jurisdictions 
Municipalities 
inside SBT 
jurisdiction 
urban areas 
Municipalities 
inside SBT 
jurisdictions 
outside urban 
areas 
1993 2,989 2,975 14 79 64 
1994 2,995 2,975 20 103 109 
1995 2,997 2,975 22 111 127 
1996 2,996 2,973 23 115 130 
1997 2,985 2,955 30 136 187 
1998 2,981 2,948 33 144 206 
1999 2,969 2,929 40 163 252 
2000 2,479 2,350 129 739 852 
2001 2,108 1,899 209 1,189 1,475 
2002 1,594 1,385 209 1,211 1,616 
2003 1,234 1,028 206 1,236 1,650 
Total 28,327 27,392 935 5,226 6,668 
(*) municipality or SBT jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Weight matrices 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
neighbours 
W
contig
 
Number of 
neighbours  
W
d25
 
1993 2,989 7,647 30,830 
1994 2,995 7,687 30,762 
1995 2,997 7,701 30,701 
1996 2,996 7,703 30,646 
1997 2,985 7,716 30,485 
1998 2,981 7,705 30,394 
1999 2,969 7,699 30,202 
2000 2,479 7,405 28,126 
2001 2,108 7,067 25,924 
2002 1,594 5,801 22,511 
2003 1,234 4,824 19,353 
Total 28,327 78,955 309,934 
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Table 3: Estimation results (with exogenous SBT dummy) 
 
Methodology 
IV 
Within 
(1) 
IV 
Within 
W
contig 
(2) 
IV 
Within 
W
contig 
(3) 
IV 
Within 
W
d25 
(4) 
IV 
Within 
W
d25 
(5) 
Intercept 0.346*** -0.157 -0.174* -0.449*** -0.433*** 
Lagged endogenous variable, ti,t-1 0.738*** 0.694*** 0.692*** 0.712*** 0.711*** 
Single Business Tax (SBT) jurisdiction dummy 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.696*** 0.025*** 0.653*** 
Neighbour‟s tax rates, Wtj,t  0.246*** 0.252*** 0.335*** 0.342*** 
Neighbour‟s tax rates*SBT jurisdiction   -0.262***  -0.254*** 
County tax rate, t
C 
0.057*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.029** 0.028** 
Regional tax rate, t
R 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.007 
Density 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
Average income -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
Share of under 14s 0.013 0.023 0.022 0.026* 0.026* 
Share of over 60s -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 25,137 25,137 25,137 25,137 25,137 
Number of individuals 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 
Adj. R² 0.495 0.510 0.511 0.506 0.507 
Weakness of instruments: Partial adj. R²      
Lagged endogenous variable, ti,t-1 0.523 0.524 0.525 0.525 0.526 
Neighbour‟s tax rates, Wtj,t  0.483 0.485 0.536 0.536 
Neighbour‟s tax rates*SBT jurisdiction   0.474  0.557 
County tax rate, t
C 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.700 0.700 
Regional tax rate, t
R 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Validity of instruments: Sargan test 
0.14 
(1) 
1.44 
(3) 
2.85 
(5) 
3.46 
(2) 
4.96 
(3) 
Exogeneity test: Fisher test 180.82*** 141.30*** 112.81*** 144.74*** 113.92*** 
(1) Instruments: time lag of local property tax rate, time lag of local residential tax rate, county property tax 
rate, regional property tax rate 
(2) Instruments: as (1) plus spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of the share of under 14s, spatial 
lag of the share of over 60s 
(3) Instruments: as (2), plus spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by the SBT jurisdiction dummy, 
spatial lag of the share of under 14s multiplied by the SBT jurisdiction dummy, spatial lag of the share of over 
60s multiplied by the SBT jurisdiction dummy 
(4) Instruments: as (1), plus spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of the share of under 14s 
(5) Instruments: as (4), plus spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by the SBT jurisdiction dummy, 
spatial lag of the share of under 14s multiplied by the SBT jurisdiction dummy 
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Table 4: Estimation results (endogenous SBT dummy) 
 
 
 
TPU endogène 
Methodology 
IV 
Within 
(1) 
IV 
Within 
W
contig 
(2) 
IV 
Within 
W
contig 
(3) 
IV 
Within 
W
d25 
(4) 
IV 
Within 
W
d25 
(5) 
Intercept 0.351*** -0.129 -0.196* -0.386*** -0.439*** 
Lagged endogenous variable, ti,t-1 0.739*** 0.695*** 0.691*** 0.714*** 0.709*** 
Single Business Tax (SBT) jurisdiction dummy 0.014** 0.035*** 0.684** 0.019*** 1.110*** 
Neighbour‟s tax rates, Wtj,t  0.245*** 0.251*** 0.333*** 0.341*** 
Neighbour‟s tax rates*SBT jurisdiction   -0.256**  -0.438*** 
County tax rate, t
C 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.031** 0.028** 
Regional tax rate, t
R -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.007 
Density 0.033** 0.027* 0.039*** 0.029* 0.038*** 
Average income -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
Share of under 14s 0.014 0.024 0.021 0.027* 0.026* 
Share of over 60s -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 25,137 25,137 25,137 25,137 25,137 
Number of individuals 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 
Weakness of instruments: Partial adj. R²      
Lagged endogenous variable, ti,t-1 0.528 0.530 0.531 0.531 0.532 
Single Business Tax jurisdiction dummy 0.631 0.633 0.742 0.632 0.706 
Neighbour‟s tax rates, Wtj,t  0.485 0.498 0.535 0.591 
Neighbour‟s tax rates*SBT jurisdiction   0.744  0.704 
County tax rate, t
C 0.700 0.700 0.710 0.702 0.709 
Regional tax rate, t
R 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Validity of instruments: Sargan test 
3.81 
(2) 
1.50 
(4) 
10.62 
(15) 
3.90 
(3) 
11.24 
(7) 
Exogeneity test: Fisher test 135.98*** 113.23*** 94.58*** 116.23*** 97.31*** 
(1) Instruments: time lag of local property tax rate, time lag of local residential tax rate, county property tax 
rate, regional property tax rate, propensity to cooperate, share of area that the observation represent in the 
total area in the sample at time t. The propensity to cooperate is the ratio among the number of groups and the 
number of spatial units divided by the ratio among the number of municipalities in a SBT group and the total 
number of groups (all variables are included at time t and calculated in a circle of 50 km around the spatial 
unit observed). 
(2) Instruments: as (1) plus spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of the share of under 14s, spatial 
lag of the share of over 60s 
(3) Instruments: as (2), plus spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by propensity to cooperate, spatial 
lag of local residential tax rate multiplied by propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of density multiplied by 
propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of average income multiplied by propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of the 
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share of under 14s multiplied by propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of the share of over 60s multiplied by 
propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by share of area, spatial lag of local 
residential tax rate multiplied by share of area, spatial lag of density multiplied by share of area, spatial lag of 
average income multiplied by share of area, spatial lag of the share of under 14s multiplied by share of area, 
spatial lag of the share of over 60s multiplied by share of area. 
(4) Instruments: as (1), plus spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of the share of under 14s 
(5) Instruments: as (4), plus spatial lag of local residential tax rate, spatial lag of local property tax rate 
multiplied by propensity to cooperate, spatial lag of local residential tax rate multiplied by propensity to 
cooperate, spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by share of area, spatial lag of local residential tax 
rate multiplied by share of area. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5a : Estimation results first equation (GMM) 
 
 
Methodology: GMM (1) 
(2) 
W
contig
 
(3) 
W
contig
 
(4) 
W
d25
 
(5) 
W
d25
 
Neighbour‟s tax rates, Wtj,t  0.620*** 0.596*** 0.783*** 0.817*** 
Neighbour‟s tax rates*SBT jurisdiction   -0.606***  -0.802*** 
County tax rate, t
C 
0.118*** 0.072** 0.079*** 0.126*** 0.088*** 
Regional tax rate, t
R 
-0.032 -0.015 -0.022** -0.014 -0.011 
Density 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.053*** 0.095*** 0.058*** 
Average income -0.032*** -0.020** -0.019* -0.023** -0.020** 
Share of under 14s -0.005 0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 
Share of over 60s -0.039 -0.013 -0.020 -0.004 -0.023 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 28,327 28,327 28,327 28,327 28,327 
Number of individuals 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 
Number of clusters 286 286 286 286 286 
Underidentification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
46.04 
(6)*** 
55.42 
(13)*** 
76.32 
(26)*** 
46.00 
(14)*** 
73.32 
(25)*** 
Validity of instruments: Hansen J statistic 
9.03 
(5) 
18.23 
(12) 
29.41 
(25) 
19.68 
(13) 
28.54 
(24) 
(1) Instruments: county density, county average income, county share of over 60s, county property tax rate, 
county residential tax rate, regional share of over 60s, regional property tax rate 
(2) Instruments: county density, county average income, county share of under 14s, county property tax rate, 
county residential tax rate, regional density, regional average income, regional share of under 14s, regional 
share of over 60s, regional property tax rate, spatial lag of density, spatial lag of average income, spatial lag of 
the share of over 60s, spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of local residential tax rate 
(3) Instruments: as (2), plus county share of over 60s, spatial lag of the share of under 14s, spatial lag of density 
multiplied by observation area spatial lag of average income multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of the 
share of under 14s multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of the share of over 60s multiplied by observation 
area, spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of local residential tax rate 
multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of density multiplied by number of years that the observation is 
present in the sample, spatial lag of average income multiplied by number of years that the observation is 
present in the sample, spatial lag of the share of under 14s multiplied by by number of years that the 
observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of the share of over 60s multiplied by number of years that the 
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observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by number of years that 
the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of local residential tax rate multiplied by number of years 
that the observation is present in the sample 
(4) Instruments: as (1), plus county share of under 14s, regional average income, regional share of under 14s, 
spatial lag of density, spatial lag of average income, spatial lag of the share of under 14s, spatial lag of the share 
of over 60s, spatial lag of local property tax rate, spatial lag of local residential tax rate 
(5) Instruments: as (4), plus spatial lag of density multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of average income 
multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of the share of under 14s multiplied by observation area, spatial lag 
of the share of over 60s multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of local property tax rate multiplied by 
observation area, spatial lag of local residential tax rate multiplied by observation area, spatial lag of density 
multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of average income 
multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of the share of under 
14s multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of the share of over 
60s multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of local property tax 
rate multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample, spatial lag of local residential 
tax rate multiplied by number of years that the observation is present in the sample. 
 
 
 
Table 5b: Estimation results second equation (OLS) 
Methodology: GMM (1) 
(2) 
W
contig
 
(3) 
W
contig 
W
contig
*SB
T 
(4) 
W
d25
 
(5) 
W
d25 
W
d25
*SBT 
Intercept 1.974*** 0.450*** 0.678*** -0.101*** 0.164*** 
Single Business Tax (SBT) jurisdiction dummy 0.340*** 0.331*** 1.821*** 0.279*** 2.237*** 
Number of observations 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 
Number of clusters 286 286 286 286 286 
Underidentification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
69.35 
(2)*** 
69.35 
(2)*** 
69.35 
(2)*** 
69.35 
(2)*** 
69.35 
(2)*** 
Validity of instruments: Hansen J statistic 
2.56 
(1) 
0.08 
(1) 
0.02 
(1) 
0.12 
(1) 
0.40 
(1) 
(1)-(5) Instruments: observation area, number of years that the observation is present in the sample 
 
 
Table 5c: Estimation results MLE 
Methodology: MLE (1) 
(2) 
W
contig
 
(3) 
W
contig 
W
contig
*SB
T 
(4) 
W
d25
 
(5) 
W
d25 
W
d25
*SBT 
Intercept 2.002*** 0.459*** 0.686*** -0.096*** 0.168 
Single Business Tax (SBT) jurisdiction dummy 0.172*** 0.201*** 1.698*** 0.172*** 2.133 
Number of observations 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 3,190 
(1)-(5) Instruments observation area, number of years that the observation is present in the sample 
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Table A1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Municipal tax rate 
Neighbour‟s tax rates (Wd25) 
Neighbour‟s tax rates (Wcontig) 
County tax rate 
Regional tax rate 
Density 
Average income 
Share of under 14s 
Share of over 60s 
13.709 
11.878 
12.926 
6.865 
2.049 
1063.63 
16.000 
19.247 
19.340 
5.084 
2.934 
3.838 
1.573 
0.537 
2055.301 
5.079 
2.687 
5.207 
0.279 
3.820 
1.598 
3.650 
0.907 
17.138 
5.784 
9.429 
3.210 
30.510 
25.229 
27.078 
13.300 
3.330 
24581.743 
81.746 
31.284 
46.460 
 
Note: All tax rates are in percentages. Number of observations: 25137. 
 
 
 
